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1. INTRODUCTION
To communicate, speakers need to make it clear what they are talking about. Referring expressions
play a crucial part in achieving this, by anchoring utterances to things. Examples of referring
expressions include noun phrases such as “this phenomenon,” “it,” and “the phenomenon to which
this Topic is devoted.” Reference is studied throughout the Cognitive Sciences (vanDeemter, 2016).
Recent years have seen a new wave of work in this area, as witnessed by a number of journal
Special Issues.1The Research Topic “Models of Reference” in Frontiers in Psychology is a new
milestone, focussing on contributions from Psycholinguistics and Computational Linguistics.
Unsurprisingly given the journal, the response to our Call for Papers has focussed
predominantly on psycholinguistic work. A majority of submissions dealt with language
production, as opposed to comprehension. In what follows, we summarize the papers accepted
for this Research Topic, stressing some of the main themes emerging, including audience design
(Section 2); overspecification (Section 3); visual perception, and variation between speakers
(Section 4). We end with some general observations.
2. AUDIENCE DESIGN AND THEORY OF MIND USE
Successful communication requires that speakers and hearers take each other’s knowledge into
account, yet recent studies have questioned the extent to which they are able to do this (e.g., Horton
and Keysar, 1996; Keysar et al., 2003). The present Research Topic shows that reference is still a key
battleground in this debate.
Ibarra and Tanenhaus, for instance, investigate to what extent interlocutors are able to switch
between different ways to conceptualize an object, as a function of the conversational setting in
which the dialogue takes place; for example, a part of an object may be called a “wrench” in
one setting (because it looks like one) but a “leg” in another (because that’s its function). The
authors conclude that switching between conceptualizations takes place with remarkable ease:
“conceptual pacts are fluid temporary agreements.” Branigan et al. focus on 8- to 10-year-old
children, investigating the extent to which these are able to assess Common Ground developed
through prior linguistic context, and whether this is sensitive to variations in prior interactions with
the listener. Similar to adults, children adjust the length of their referring expressions depending on
1For instance, in Language, Cognition, and Neuroscience in 2014 (http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/plcp21/29/8), and in
Topics in Cognitive Science in 2012 (http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/tops.2012.4.issue-2/issuetoc). See also Gatt
et al. (2014).
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whether, in the preceding conversation, their conversational
partner was a side-participant (who both saw the object and
heard the expression), an overhearer (who only heard the
expression), or a new participant. Nadig et al. put the spotlight
on adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Although these were
less likely than neurotypical speakers to adapt their referential
behavior to their interlocutor, what stands out from their work, is
how subtle the differences in behavior were, given that referential
Audience Design may be thought to be particularly challenging
for people with autism (see also earlier studies such as Begeer
et al., 2010).
A new strand of work seeks to model interlocutors’ reasoning
about Common Ground more precisely than before. Our Topic
contains two examples, which complement each other neatly:
The article by Gegg-Harrison and Tanenhaus follows on from
Heller et al. (2012), asking what an interlocutor can figure
out, from earlier dialogue moves, about the likelihood that her
interlocutor is familiar with a given proper name. Kutlák, et al.
focus on situations where the hearer does not know the name of
the referent, so it is crucial that suitable properties are selected
for inclusion in the referring expression. The authors offer a
computational model of a speaker’s assessment of the likelihood
that the hearer knows about any given property of a referent (e.g.,
that Darwin wrote “On the Origin of Species”).
Horton and Brennan, finally, step back to discuss the
information stored by interlocutors about what has been said
over the course of a dialogue, asking what it is that they remember
of it, and whether these meta-representations are subject to
specific constraints. Proposing a synthesis of their earlier work,
they argue that “any representations that capture information
about others’ perspectives are likely to be relatively simple and
subject to the same kinds of constraints on attention andmemory
that influence other kinds of cognitive representations.” The use
of generic psychological mechanisms is a theme that can be
discerned in other papers as well, as we will see.
3. OVERSPECIFICATION
Much research has focussed on speakers’ inclination to include
more information in referring expressions than hearers require
for identifying the referent (Pechmann, 1989; Engelhardt
et al., 2006), a phenomenon known as overspecification.
Overspecification features strongly in the contributions by
Rubio-Fernández, by Tarenskeen et al., and by Westerbeek et al.
Westerbeek et al. examine an idea that, though it has been
examined in the past (e.g, Sedivy, 2003), has recently come to the
fore, namely that properties that are atypical for a particular type
of object are particularly likely to be included in a reference to
the object.While these authors confirm earlier findings, focussing
especially on color, they also find that the color typicality effect is
moderated by color diagnosticity: it is strongest for high-color-
diagnostic objects (i.e., objects with a simple shape). Atypicality
is likewise discussed by Rubio-Fernández. Scrutinizing the well-
attested propensity of color terms to be used in overspecification,
she found that this propensity is modulated by factors such
as typicality and the extent to which color can facilitate object
recognition. Tarenskeen et al. focus their take on these issues
on another dimension of variation between properties, namely
whether they express an absolute property (such as color) or a
relative one (such as size).
The contribution of Brodbeck et al. shows, following on
from earlier studies such as Engelhardt et al. (2011), how brain
studies that measure ERP can track the time course of the
process whereby a hearer comprehends a referring expression.
Among other things, their work suggests that when we read an
overspecified expression, then even after we have identified the
referent, we reactivate the corresponding representation when
processing additional words. The authors argue that this might
explain the benefits that overspecification (cf. Section 3) has been
shown to have in some situations.
Finally, while the paper by Pogue et al. is concerned with
overspecification, it is also relevant to our proposed theme
of rationality. These authors asked how listeners might make
rational use of linguistic information despite the fact that the
linguistic input to which they are exposed often includes more, or
less, information than what is necessary and sufficient for a given
referential intention. Their model suggests that part of the answer
lies in hearers’ ability to adapt their expectations to a particular
speaker. This brings us to a final strand of work discussed in this
Topic.
4. VISION AND INDIVIDUAL VARIATION
4.1. Visual Perception and Salience
Reference, of course, is not tied to any particular perceptual
modality—we routinely talk about things we have never seen.
Yet much of our knowledge of the production of referring
expressions has focussed on visual domains. A number of articles
in this Topic extend this body of knowledge, with an emphasis on
links with visual perception.
The papers by Clarke et al. and by Baltaretu et al. exemplify
this line of work, inquiring how the perceptual configuration of
a visual display influences reference. Baltaretu et al. find that
when referring to an object using a spatial relation (e.g., “the
ball between the doll and the train”), speakers’ choice of relatum
depends in part on its spatial location in the scene. Clarke et al.
focus on scenes with visual clutter. Their main finding is that
the visual salience of objects affects their order of mention in
a description, a finding that is mirrored by an experiment in
which salient objects are shown to be detected faster if they are
mentioned earlier. Taken together, these findings support the
view that visual perception is tightly coupled with language use
(Tanenhaus et al., 1995).
4.2. Individual Variation
Variation between people is a basic observation in psychology,
and studies of language production are starting to focus on
this reality. Using machine learning, Kibrik et al. offer a model
of the choice between different types of referring expression.
They focus directly on the issue of variation, examining its
implications for computational models of language production.
The contribution by Hendriks takes a more theoretical
approach, hypothesizing that differences in cognitive capacity
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can explain an important part of the observed variation between
speakers. Hendriks discusses a model based on the cognitive
architecture ACT-R (e.g., Anderson, 1993), which focusses
on individual differences in processing speed and working
memory capacity, arguing that these factors can be predictive of
both underspecification and overspecification, and of listeners’s
tendency to misunderstand referring expressions as well. The
contribution by Peters et al., finally, argues that although
pronouns and repeated references are processed in different
ways, these differences can be explained by general memory
principles such as interference, suppression, and competition.
This idea is consonant with those of Horton and Brennan (see
above), who emphasize generic psychological mechanisms as
well.
5. CONCLUSION
Collectively, the papers in this Research Topic show that the
study of reference is continuing to attract a large amount of
interesting work. Speaking in general, we were struck by an
openness to new research methods and paradigms, including
neuro-cognitive methods and computational modeling.
Focussing more specifically on the aforementioned themes,
we continue to see a large amount of work on audience design,
but rather than investigating whether adults are cooperative
or not (as in most previous research), researchers now realize
that it is not an all-or-nothing issue and investigate what
information speakers use for being cooperative, they study
different participant populations and build models of cooperative
behavior in a range of different communicative situations. As for
overspecification, where earlier work has tended to single out
particular properties (e.g., color) as having a high propensity for
being used in overspecification, the papers in this Topic paint a
subtler picture, where a property may be overspecification-prone
in some situations but not in others. Research on individual
variation, finally, is still in its infancy, but the paper by Hendriks
shows one promising direction in which this research may go,
by focusing on general memory principles and known cognitive
differences between individuals. We expect that these issues will
be fleshed out in future by new computational models as well as
by brain studies.
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